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Trends in Communist Propaganda

23 Apr 75

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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23 APRIL 1975

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi and PRG media exude confidence that communist forces have achieved an unassailable military position in South Vietnam and will be able to achieve a final victory without compromise. The propaganda quickly quashed any hope that President Thieu's 21 April resignation might provide an opening for a political settlement; and the ascension of Tran Van Huong to the GVN presidency was denounced as nothing but a "horse-changing farce" performed at the behest of the United States. The media reiterate demands for an end to U.S. involvement in Vietnam and U.S. support for Thieu's administration, but these demands are no longer advanced as PRG preconditions for negotiations with a new Saigon government. Thus, there is no assurance in the current comment that the communists would be willing to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power, even if their extreme demands were met.

The Vietnamese communists' sense that their victory is at hand is evident in the tone of comment on Thieu's resignation as well as in commentaries praising the unprecedented communist military achievements. Liberation Radio has been the most ebullient, maintaining in routine commentaries that "the day of victory . . . is not far away" and that "nothing at this juncture can reverse, prevent, or delay the certain victory of our armed forces and people." Hanoi media have been somewhat more restrained, typically characterizing the military situation as propitious to the "acceleration" of "offensive and uprising."

The fall of Phnom Penh has been greeted in statements by the Cambodian Front leaders underlining their strength and unity and reiterating pledges that Cambodia would remain independent and nonaligned. Hanoi comment on Cambodia has emphasized the "failure" of the United States and underscored the importance of Indochinese unity. Peking has stressed the importance of Sino-Cambodian solidarity in achieving Cambodian Front successes and has lambasted Soviet intentions in the area while treating the United States with typical restraint. Moscow reflected its defensiveness as a late supporter of the Front, stressing the alleged continuity of its backing.

PRG, HANOI TERM THIEU'S RESIGNATION A U.S.-SPONSORED "FARCE"

Less than an hour after Thieu's 21 April resignation speech, a Liberation Radio broadcast set the pattern for later PRG and DRV comment by describing the successor government under President Tran

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Van Huong as "a new political scheme, a Nguyen Van Thieu regime without Thieu." The view that the GVN administration's nature had not changed was underlined in a Hanoi radio commentary on the same day, and on the 22d Liberation Radio observed that "the departure of this or that traitorous individual cannot help change the situation in South Vietnam." Also on the 22d a NHAN DAN commentary portrayed Thieu's "downfall" as evidence that the entire administration would be overthrown "sooner or later." And a Liberation Radio commentary on the 23d went even further in asserting that "Thieu's departure heralds the forthcoming collapse of the bellicose Nguyen Van Thieu clique and the day of victory of our people, which is not far away."

Consistent with Vietnamese communist propaganda since early April, media comment on the resignation has not raised the possibility of negotiations with a government replacing Thieu.* A 22 April Hanoi radio commentary on Thieu's resignation adjusted the standard demands to the new situation, indicating that the United States must now "abandon the Nguyen Van Thieu clique" rather than "the person of Nguyen Van Thieu."

OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY DRV AND PRG URGE RAPID U.S. EVACUATION

Hanoi and PRG propaganda has continued to reflect Vietnamese communist sensitivity to U.S. efforts to evacuate American personnel from South Vietnam and to public discussion of the possible removal of South Vietnamese who have been closely associated with the United States. Official DRV and PRG pronouncements have given assurances that U.S. personnel could leave without "difficulty or obstacle," while at the same time contending that Vietnamese should not want to leave, since they would be afforded good treatment under the terms of the publicly announced policy of the PRG. Official DRV and PRG protests of recent U.S. moves toward Vietnam have included a 16 April DRV Foreign Ministry note "categorically rejecting" the U.S. State

* The media's dropping of PRG offers to negotiate with the GVN is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 April 1975, pages 8-9. The revival last summer of pre-peace agreement calls for Thieu's overthrow is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 August 1974, pages 14-17. Background on the formalization of these calls in the 8 October 1974 and 21 March 1975 PRG statements appears in the TRENDS of 9 October 1975, pages 11-12, and 26 March 1975, pages 6-10, respectively.

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Department note of the 11th; a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 19th "condemning the entry of the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise into South Vietnamese waters"; and PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements of the 20th and 22d, respectively, urging the quick withdrawal from Vietnam of U.S. personnel.

The DRV Foreign Ministry note of the 16th routinely claimed--without responding directly to its contents--that the U.S. note constituted "slanderous allegations" and went on to recite a litany of standard DRV complaints against the United States and Saigon. The DRV note denied that the communists had any intention of maltreating Vietnamese who have cooperated with the United States, and it charged that the United States had resorted to "emotional contentions and sophistic allegations," adding that the only right way to settle the South Vietnam problem was stated in the 21 March PRG statement.

Pegged specifically to the U.S. evacuation efforts in South Vietnam, the PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements on the 20th and 22d argued that the United States has the capability to withdraw all "its disguised military personnel . . . in two or three days, even within 24 hours," if it so desired. This could be accomplished with the transport facilities "used to illegally introduce weapons to South Vietnam and to carry out the forcible evacuation of the populace and abduction of Vietnamese children," the PRG Foreign Ministry asserted. The PRG statement also seemed to take pains to distinguish between American "military personnel disguised as civilians" and those who were considered "foreign residents"--a distinction that earlier PRG propaganda had tended to blur.* While not precisely defining who qualified as a foreign resident, the PRG Foreign Ministry observed that their lives and property would be protected "on condition that they respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam and observe the laws of the Republic of South Vietnam." It added that the PRG "welcomes those foreign residents who contribute to the struggle for independence and freedom and building the country of the South Vietnamese people."

* See the TRENDS of 9 April 1975, pages 3-6, for a discussion of PRG allegations that Americans in Vietnam are disguised military personnel.

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PEKING HAILS VIETNAMESE "VICTORIES," NOTES THIEU RESIGNATION

The first public assessment by a Chinese leader of the communist military successes in South Vietnam during the past two months came in an 18 April speech by Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping welcoming the visiting DPRK delegation headed by Kim Il-song. Praise for the Vietnamese communists' military advances was subsequently echoed in a speech by CCP Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying at a 19 April Peking rally celebrating the "liberation" of Phnom Penh, and by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien in a 20 April speech in Pakistan. Authoritative Chinese comment on recent military developments in Vietnam had previously been restricted to PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles endorsing official Vietnamese communist statements. In early April Li Hsien-nien had not mentioned Vietnam or the Indochina situation in his speeches on world affairs during a visit to Iran and Vice Premier Chang Chun-chiao similarly ignored Indochina in speeches during a visit to Peking by the Tunisian Prime Minister.

Citing recent communist victories in Cambodia and South Vietnam as "proof" of Peking's thesis on rising Third World opposition to the superpowers, Teng Hsiao-ping focused on the Vietnamese communists' "great victories," disparaged the utility of further U.S. aid and reiterated the standard Chinese pledge of support for the Vietnamese communists. In apparent agreement with the Vietnamese communists' concentration on pressing their military advantage in South Vietnam, Teng stressed the need for "fighting" to drive out imperialist invaders and their local collaborators. He claimed that the recent communist battle successes had proven the validity of the Mao Tse-tung 20 May 1970 admonition that small nations can defeat large aggressors, provided they take up arms and fight.*

NCNA ON THIEU A 22 April NCNA report said that the resignation of President Thieu was "a U.S.-masterminded political fraud" designed to save the Saigon regime from collapse. Explicitly citing Secretary Kissinger's statement that "the United States does not support individuals . . . but the Government of South Vietnam," and claiming that Thieu himself admitted to "American pressure," NCNA concluded that the United States has no intention of changing its Vietnam policies and intends to maintain "a Thieu-type puppet regime" in Saigon. NCNA predicted with confidence that the Saigon government was doomed "no matter what political schemes" the United States resorted to.

* Peking's recent stress on the importance of armed struggle to drive out invaders has also figured prominently in extensive Chinese comment on the fall of Phnom Penh. See the article on Cambodia in this TRENDS.

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CAMBODIAN FRONT AND ALLIES HAIL FALL OF PHNOM PENH •

Initial authoritative comment by the Cambodian Front (NUFC) on the fall of Phnom Penh includes an 18 April message of congratulations from Prince Norodom Sihanouk to Khieu Samphan, RGNU Deputy Prime Minister and Front military chief, a speech by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth at a 19 April "grand rally" in Peking, and a 22 April statement by Khieu Samphan.

Among the Front's allies, Peking's reaction has been the most exuberant; in addition to the Peking rally, addressed by CCP Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, Peking welcomed the victory in a PRC leaders' message to Sihanouk, Penn Nouth, and Khieu Samphan, and in an 18 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. Hanoi marked the fall of Phnom Penh, which it called a victory of Indochinese unity, with a congratulatory message, an editorial in the party paper NHAN DAN, and a "friendship" meeting addressed by Vice Premier Phan Trong Tue on the 18th. Moscow's only authoritative reaction was in a congratulatory message from the Soviet leaders which, like routine comment, was at pains to stress support for the new Cambodian regime.

THE FRONT The Front messages duly reaffirmed the insurgent leaders' ostensible unity under Prince Sihanouk, pledged to fulfill past promises that Cambodia would remain independent and nonaligned, and harshly criticized "U.S. imperialism" while avoiding previous invective against the Ford Administration by name.

Portraying a unified leadership, Khieu Samphan's message on the 22d extended congratulations to the armed forces "on behalf of the NUFC headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, the RGNU with Samdech Penn Nouth as Prime Minister, and the CPNLAF High Command." Penn Nouth said on the 19th that the Front victory was "due to the union and complete unity" of the Cambodian people under the "banner of the NUFC with Head of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as its chairman." Sihanouk's official statements have made no reference to his possible future role in a Cambodian government, although his message on the 18th did note future Front plans for development and national reconstruction, and wished the Cambodian people full success in these endeavors.

The Khieu Samphan message on the 22d was the first major Front pronouncement to be carried by the Phnom Penh radio since it was taken over by the Front. A brief statement by RGNU Information Minister Hou Nim, broadcast by the station immediately prior to Khieu Samphan's message, disclosed that "Today . . . the NUFC radio starts

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broadcasting from Phnom Penh." The Front's two other radio transmissions, "the Voice of the NUFC" and "The Voice of the NUFC of Phnom Penh," have not been heard since 21 April.

PEKING Peking has used the occasion of Phnom Penh's fall to put on an extraordinary display of Sino-Cambodian solidarity and portray the Cambodian struggle as a model for international resistance to imperialism. Unlike their Cambodian allies, the Chinese have softened criticism of the United States while sharply warning of alleged Soviet designs in Cambodia.

Even though Sihanouk did not attend the Peking rally on the 19th--AFP reported that Sihanouk declined the invitation in order to be with his dying mother--Peking marked the occasion with a major leadership turnout of 11 full and three alternate CCP Politburo members, including the three active CCP vice chairmen. On the previous day Peking also had shown highly unusual attention to Cambodia and "Head of State" Sihanouk when, according to NCNA, a Chinese delegation led by CCP Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping and Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien went to Sihanouk's residence in Peking to present the PRC leaders' congratulatory message signed by Mao Tse-tung, NPC Chairman Chu Teh, and Premier Chou En-lai. Upon receiving the Chinese leaders bearing the congratulatory message, Sihanouk lauded the reliability of China's "all-out support" over the years. Peking went even further at the Peking rally, praising PRC-ROU relations as an international ideal and lauding China's "many-sided support materially, politically and morally."

Chinese comment has lauded the Cambodians' "correct line" in their struggle and portrayed the insurgent victory as confirmation of the conclusions in Mao's 20 May 1970 statement--that "the people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression by a big country, if only they dare to rise up in struggle, dare to take up arms and grasp in their own hands the destiny of their country." The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 18th went to unusual lengths to underline the significance of the Cambodian "victory" in demonstrating the overriding importance of the development of "people's armed forces" and the pursuit of "people's war" as the "only" way to drive out "imperialists." The editorial asserted that the Cambodian "victory has set a splendid example" for other "oppressed" nations and people, but it made no specific reference to Vietnam in this regard. At the rally on the 19th, Yeh Chien-ying also lauded the Cambodian "example" and added that it was providing "an impetus to the further development of the excellent situation in Indochina as a whole."

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Underscoring Peking's recent shrill warnings of Soviet designs and perfidy concerning Cambodia, both Yeh Chien-ying and the editorial offered extensive criticism of Moscow's Cambodian policy. The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial characterized Moscow's continuation of ties with Lon Nol and its belated recognition of the RGNU as "the predicament of a political gambler who has lost his all."

HANOI Hanoi has hailed the Cambodian "victory" as a U.S. setback and depicted Indochinese unity as a prime factor in the insurgents' success. The 18 April NHAN DAN editorial characterized Phnom Penh's fall as marking "the complete bankruptcy of the Nixon Doctrine in Cambodia" and as "a heavy setback for the U.S. policy of aggression and intervention in Indochina and the world." The congratulatory message from DRV President Ton Duc Thang, Premier Pham Van Dong, and Vice Premier Vo Nguyen Giap played up Indochinese unity in the face of the common enemy as instrumental in Phnom Penh's collapse. At a meeting sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee and the Vietnam-Cambodian Friendship Association and attended by DRV Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh, Phan Trong Tue noted that the two sides' common struggle has made Cambodia and the DRV "increasingly closer to one another, understand one another better, and wholeheartedly support and aid one another." Tue also pledged the "ironlike determination" of the DRV to enhance its "solidarity, friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid" with the new Cambodian regime.

MOSCOW Reflecting a Soviet desire to convey an image of constancy in Moscow's support for the Front, the 18 April message of CPSU Secretary General Brezhnev, Soviet President Podgornyy and Premier Kosygin assured Sihanouk and the Front that Moscow would continue to develop its "traditional" relations of "friendship and fruitful cooperation" with Cambodia. The message was accompanied by an 18 April announcement that the Soviet Government, "guided by its unfailing policy of supporting" the RGNU, would send "material aid of a humanitarian nature" to Cambodia "in the near future." Kosygin reiterated Moscow's intention to strive "as before" to develop friendly relations with Cambodia at a 21 April Kremlin meeting with the RGNU charge d'affaires in Moscow. A commentary by Aleksandr Zholkver beamed in English to Southeast Asia on 19 April also pointed out that "it will not be easy to recover from the ravages of war, but the people of Cambodia have true friends who will stand by them in this difficult period."

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR-EGYPT COMMUNIQUE TIES PARTIAL ACCORDS TO GENEVA TALKS

Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's 19-22 April visit to Moscow,* while registering no evident gains on Soviet-Egyptian bilateral issues, appears to have resulted in Soviet-Egyptian agreement on a new formulation for a Mideast peace settlement that would tie any new Arab-Israeli bilateral accords to the framework of the Geneva conference. In a joint communique on the visit, Moscow and Cairo agreed that "any partial measures and corresponding decisions on them must be a component, inseparable part of a general settlement and must be worked out and taken within the framework of the conference on the Middle East." The two sides also called for the "earliest" resumption of the conference while counseling its "careful preparation." During the visit there were indications of persistent Soviet-Egyptian disagreements over bilateral issues, as well as over some practical aspects of preparing for the Geneva talks. Egyptian media have reported that Gromyko will visit Cairo in May to continue preparations for the conference and that Brezhnev plans to visit Egypt at some unspecified future date.

BILATERAL RELATIONS Fahmi's visit included talks on the 19th, 20th, and 21st with Gromyko and a meeting with Brezhnev on the 21st, during which several major areas of Soviet-Egyptian relations were reportedly discussed. There have been no indications, however, that progress or new agreements were achieved on bilateral issues. On the contrary, Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA), while stating on the 20th that Fahmi's talks with Gromyko had covered bilateral relations "in detail, including military, economic and other aspects," also reported Fahmi's remark after the meeting that "several issues" remained to be solved--specifically, "economic and military aspects and the rescheduling of debts." According to TASS, Brezhnev in his meeting with Fahmi did reaffirm that Moscow would continue its policy of rendering "all kinds of assistance and support to the Arab people in their struggle to eliminate the aftermath of Israeli aggression and establish lasting peace in the Middle East." Brezhnev had made the same pledge, however, when receiving Fahmi during his last two trips to Moscow in October and December 1974.

* During Fahmi's last visit to Moscow, 28-30 December 1974, Brezhnev's scheduled trip to the Middle East was abruptly and indefinitely postponed. For details see the TRENDS of 31 December 1974, pp. 1-4.

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Both Gromyko and Fahmi acknowledged persistent strains in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Gromyko, for instance, at a dinner in Fahmi's honor on the 19th, asserted that Moscow's policy toward Egypt had been intended to "preserve everything good" and to deepen and enrich the relationship further, on the basis of the 1971 treaty of friendship and cooperation. He emphasized "on behalf of the Soviet leadership and Leonid Ilich Brezhnev personally" that this remained Moscow's policy. "Of course," Gromyko added--in a passage singled out and quoted in a Moscow radio commentary in Arabic on the 22d--such tasks can only be solved "provided Egypt, the Egyptian leadership, pursue the same kind of policy with regard to the Soviet Union." Fahmi, in an arrival statement reported by TASS and also by Moscow radio's Arabic service, said his visit would allow him to complete talks he had had with Gromyko in early February 1975* and that whereas Egypt was satisfied with recent progress in Soviet-Egyptian relations "in some fields," it looked forward to similar progress "in all other fields." Prior to his departure from Moscow, Fahmi was cited by MENA, but not Soviet media, as saying that he believed Soviet-Egyptian relations would "gradually take their natural course," adding that if each side tried to understand the other's positions, mutually beneficial relations would develop.

In an evident attempt to exert pressure on Moscow, Fahmi and Cairo media sought to establish an explicit linkage between the state of Soviet-Egyptian relations and resumption of the Geneva conference. Thus Cairo radio on the 20th quoted Fahmi as saying that "talks with the Soviet Union on bilateral relations are necessary as a step toward holding the Geneva conference." Some Egyptian press comment, coinciding with Fahmi's arrival in Moscow, had made the same point. MENA on the 19th, citing AL-AHRAM and AL-AKHBAR, said that Soviet-Egyptian relations and the Geneva talks were "two aspects of one reality" and stressed that coordination of the two countries' positions would be facilitated if "misunderstandings" could be overcome. This sentiment was voiced more explicitly in a Cairo radio commentary on the 19th which asserted that the Geneva conference "will have no effect if Egypt's economic, political, and military position is not consolidated to a degree that allows it to act from a position of strength inside the conference, when confronting an Israel saturated with support from the United States."

* Gromyko's trip to the Middle East in early February 1975 is treated in the TRENDS of 5 February, pp. 1-7.

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LINKAGE OF GENEVA,
"PARTIAL MEASURES"

The most notable aspect of the visit was the new formulation in the communique declaring that "any partial measures and corresponding decisions on them must be a component, inseparable part of a general settlement and must be worked out and taken within the framework" of the Geneva conference. Judging from Cairo media treatment, it seems plausible that this formulation was the subject of last-minute negotiating. MENA released the "text" of the communique the evening of the 21st, before Fahmi's departure on the 22d. The MENA version, which did not include the new formulation, bore some signs of haste, including one apparently dropped phrase. A Cairo radio broadcast of the communique two hours later on the 21st corrected the obvious omission and supplied titles for the officials mentioned, but still omitted the phrase on partial measures. Early on the morning of the 22d Cairo radio rebroadcast the communique, this time adding the formulation. The communique as subsequently released later on the 22d by TASS and Moscow's domestic service was identical to the final Cairo radio version.

The new formulation would appear to offer Moscow several advantages. Evidence from past Soviet-Egyptian communiqués suggests that it may represent yet another attempt by Moscow to exert influence and guidance on Egypt's independent diplomacy. Since the January 1974 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, the communiqués have suggested various efforts on Moscow's part to get Cairo to consult with the USSR on its policies and moves. The communique on Fahmi's talks in Moscow in January 1974, for example, after the Sinai disengagement, emphasized that "a very important factor" in the struggle for a just Mideast settlement "is close coordination of actions of the Soviet Union and Egypt in all stages of this struggle, including in the work of the peace conference on the Middle East, in all its working bodies that may be formed." Subsequently, the communiqués on Gromyko's March 1974 and February 1975 visits to Cairo both referred to the "necessity and importance" of Soviet participation "in all stages of the Middle East settlement, including all the working organs which may be set up at the Geneva conference."

At the same time, as Geneva conference co-chairman, Moscow would enhance its own status if new "partial measures" were worked out within the Geneva conference framework. Such an arrangement would also provide Moscow with a basis for seeking to influence, as well as to claim a share of the credit for, any achievements through the "partial steps" approach which Moscow has heretofore frequently criticized.

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The new formulation, along with other aspects of Moscow's treatment of the Fahmi visit, seems to suggest Soviet uncertainty over the course of Egyptian policy, as well as irritation over Cairo's failure to consult and coordinate its moves with its treaty partner. Moscow seemed to convey some concern that a new Egyptian-Israeli understanding of some sort might yet be reached prior to Geneva. For instance, TASS and PRAVDA, reporting Fahmi's dinner speech on the 19th, had him saying flatly that "the Geneva conference is the only place where the Middle East problem can be solved." But according to MENA's version, Fahmi characterized Geneva as the "only suitable place for achieving a final and comprehensive peaceful solution that will cover the roots of the problem." This would seem to leave open the possibility of a new Egyptian-Israeli understanding of some type prior to Geneva. While Fahmi was reported by Cairo radio on the 20th as "categorically refusing" to return to Secretary Kissinger's step-by-step talks, both he and President as-Sadat have implied some flexibility. Thus Fahmi, in a statement to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT reported by MENA on the 15th, said that revival of the step-by-step approach depended on the United States and, recalling as-Sadat's 29 March speech to the People's Assembly, declared that Egypt had not closed the door to any alternative. And as-Sadat, in an interview in the 14 April Beirut AN-NAHAR, did not rule out the "mere possibility" of "something happening on the Sinai front before Geneva, something like a quiet withdrawal" which could occur "without a need for negotiators."

Moscow's doubts about Egyptian policies seemed clearly reflected in an Arabic-language commentary on the 22d. Asserting that Egypt and the Soviet Union agreed on "principles and objectives" of a Mideast settlement, the broadcast called this insufficient, adding that there must be agreement as well on "tangible actions aimed at realizing those objectives." As an example of attempts by "enemies of Soviet-Egyptian friendship" to create a "rift" between Cairo and Moscow, the commentary cited Tel Aviv's continued interest in "so-called partial measures in an attempt to bypass the Geneva peace conference and deprive Egypt and other Arab countries of the opportunity of working with the Soviet Union." In this context, the broadcast hailed the 22 April joint communique for urging resumption of the Geneva conference "as soon as possible" and for including the sides' agreement that "all partial measures and related decisions should be a component and indivisible part of the general settlement. They should be included and issued within the framework of the Mideast conference."

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GENEVA CONFERENCE

Moscow's increasingly evident concern with adequate prior preparations for the Geneva conference was conveyed in several ways during Fahmi's visit. As Fahmi arrived in Moscow on the 19th, for example, Gromyko was reported by TASS as telling Egyptian newsmen that Geneva was the "right direction" to reach a Mideast settlement, "provided" it received thorough preparation. Foreboding language used in the final communique, Gromyko's dinner speech on the 19th stressed that "early reconvening" of the conference and "earnest preparations" for it were not mutually exclusive. The joint communique carried by TASS on the 22d stated that the two sides had agreed the conference "must resume its work at the earliest date" and had "stressed the importance of careful preparations" so it would lead to "final and comprehensive decisions."

Despite professions of unanimity on the need to reconvene the Geneva talks, neither Moscow nor Cairo media coverage of the visit indicated any agreement reached on such persistent problems as timing, participants, and manner of Palestinian representation. The communique again affirmed the sides' view of the need for participation by PLO representatives with "the same rights as those enjoyed by other participants."

*

CORRECTION

In the Middle East section of the 16 April 1975 TRENDS, the article "USSR-Iraq Strains Reflected in Saddam Husayn Talks in Moscow," the last sentence on page 14 should read: (In the only known Soviet discussion of possible Geneva procedures, an article by Vladimirov in the Russian edition of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No. 10, signed to press 19 September, had suggested. . . .).

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USSR FOREIGN POLICY

SOVIET MEDIA REFLECT DISARRAY OVER FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Some inconsistencies in the Soviet media's handling of detente-related issues in recent days raise questions concerning the meaning of the 16 April CPSU Central Committee plenum and the implications of the latter for U.S.-Soviet relations. Both the plenum's resolution and the prior handling of President Ford's address to Congress on 10 April suggest cross purposes within the regime over the formulation and public articulation of foreign policy. While the weight of the evidence suggests that the plenum registered a victory for Brezhnev and detente, there are also indications that Brezhnev's charter of authority to pursue detente may have been circumscribed.

PLENUM RESOLUTION The main evidence for suspecting such a circumscription is the plenum resolution itself, which contains some sharply accented negative observations about the international situation and about hostile forces in the West. Thus, while expressing full approval of Brezhnev's conduct of foreign policy and of the analysis of the world situation on which it is said to be based, the resolution draws attention to the "forces of war" which are allegedly attempting to undermine detente, and it pledges the party and government to continued vigilance in this regard. This stands in contrast to the last two CPSU plenum resolutions on foreign policy--the resolution of 19 May 1972 preceding the first Brezhnev-Nixon summit and the 27 April 1973 resolution--which do not contain such equivocal notes, although the latter does contain a brief reminder of the "need for constant vigilance."

EDITORIALS ON THE PLENUM PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA carried long and different editorials on the plenum on 18 April. PRAVDA's is staid in language and seems to be a gloss on the plenum resolution; it follows the logical order of the resolution, expanding on it only to introduce illustrative material. IZVESTIYA's, on the other hand, is more free-wheeling in style and introduces subjects not mentioned in the resolution. For example, it stresses the domestic economy and European issues much more than the resolution and PRAVDA, presumably reflecting some of the material in Gromyko's foreign policy report to the plenum or Brezhnev's report on the 25th party congress.

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While some of the differences between the two editorials appear to affect politically sensitive issues, they do not add up to a consistent pattern of pro and con positions on any one. Thus, while IZVESTIYA takes the more forthcoming position in evaluating detente ("one of the most important foreign policy events in recent years," as opposed to PRAVDA's "a fundamental turning point"), it dilates much more expansively on the opponents of detente in the United States.

Most of the other central newspapers carried PRAVDA's editorial on the 19th, none carried IZVESTIYA's, and one, SOVIET RUSSIA, carried its own, a much shorter and much more domestically oriented account than either of the others. After the April 1973 plenum, IZVESTIYA had reprinted PRAVDA's editorial. After the 19 May 1972 plenum which met prior to the first summit meeting, PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA carried different editorials, but the two were not really comparable, since PRAVDA's was much longer.

The Soviet media's handling of President Ford's 10 April address to the Congress on foreign policy also seemed to reflect crossed signals within the regime, if not, indeed, cross purposes. The initial Soviet account of the address, carried on Moscow radio's domestic service on 11 April, was a report with editorial interpolations. Essentially the same report with some minor editorial revisions and a few substantial ones was published as a TASS report in major central newspapers on the 12th and 13th. A comparison of the two versions shows that some of the changes in the edited TASS version were clearly intended to present the President's address in a softer, less critical light, and that all other changes were purely editorial in nature. The softening changes were as follows:

+ The Moscow radio version stated that the President's request for military aid was intended to maintain the "rotten Thieu regime." The TASS version carried in the press deleted the pejorative adjective.

+ The following sentence in the Moscow radio version is deleted from the TASS version: "The President's words show unequivocally the nature and extent of U.S. interference in the affairs of the South Vietnamese people."

+ The Moscow radio version said that the President tried to "justify his actions in the eyes of the world" by referring to the refugee problem. The TASS version generalizes this accusation and makes it less personal by substituting the words "United States' actions" for "his actions."

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While it is easy to explain these changes as intended to adjust the report to the prevailing line on detente, it is harder to explain why the report should have been out of line in the first place. It seems clear, at least, that the original report must have been authorized at a fairly high level, since great care would have been taken to insure that the Soviet Government's attitude was accurately reflected on such an important speech by the President at such a sensitive moment. This suggests the possibility that the inappropriate tone of the original Moscow radio report was the result not so much of an editorial mistake as of uncertain or ambiguous signals coming from the leadership.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HUSAK, RUDE PRAVO EDITORIAL ARTICLE ACCUSE DUBCEK OF "TREASON"

In the wake of the recent publication in the West of a letter that Alexander Dubcek had sent to the Czechoslovak National Assembly last fall, CPCZ General Secretary Gustav Husak has leveled the charge of treason at his predecessor, who is now a minor functionary in the forest service in Bratislava. Addressing a joint meeting of the federal, Czech, and Slovak National Front Central Committees in Prague on 16 April, Husak in his first public attack on Dubcek charged that he, as well as the deceased Josef Smrkovsky and other purged liberals, had followed a path leading from opportunism in theory and practice to "open treason." The treason charge was embellished in a RUDE PRAVO editorial article on the 19th.

In attacking Dubcek's letter--a wideranging criticism of the repressive policies of the current Prague regime--Husak charged, among other things, that renegades such as Dubcek had aided international reaction in its efforts to impede the "positive" work Husak's regime had done since he became party leader six years ago. The letter, Husak declared, had slandered the Czechoslovak party and state, as well as Prague's alliance with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. He added that Dubcek was not needed in Czechoslovakia and was free to go to the West, but that if he remained he and others like him would have to fully observe Czechoslovak laws or "face all the consequences of breaking the law."

Husak's open attack on Dubcek is the latest evidence of a hardening of the Prague regime's stance toward the purged liberals at home and abroad during the past six months. From 7 to 22 November, the Prague press and radio carried an unprecedentedly extensive series denouncing the activities of the Czechoslovak liberal emigres in the West. And on 11 December RUDE PRAVO leveled a strong attack against Dubcek in an editorial article which commemorated, for the first time, the anniversary of the December 1970 CPCZ plenum's adoption of the "Lessons" document, which harshly criticized Dubcek in explaining the events which led to the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention.*

RUDE PRAVO ARTICLE An indication that prosecution on the charge of treason may be in store for Dubcek and other purged liberals was provided by an editorial article on Husak's speech in the 19 April RUDE PRAVO entitled "The Path of Treason." Portraying

* See the TRENDS of 18 December 1974, pages 18-19.

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a rising tide of domestic opinion against Dubcek, the article said reaction at the National Front meeting on the 16th and among the general public "sharply condemned" the activities of defeated rightists such as Dubcek. In more explicit terms than those used by Husak, the article charged that Dubcek's letter, whether motivated by material gain or desire for acclaim abroad, constituted "civil and political treason, not a product of naivete or ignorance, but fully conscious and deliberate treason." The 11 December RUDE PRAVO editorial article, while also charging that Dubcek had served international reaction with the publication in the West in March 1974 of his letter of condolence to Smrkovsky's widow, had stopped short of the charge of treason, limiting its accusations against Dubcek to anticommunism and violating the party's interests.

The latest RUDE PRAVO editorial article followed up its charge of treason against Dubcek with a reiteration of the November CPCZ plenum's policy of "differentiated, individually selective" approach toward those who, like Dubcek and Smrkovsky, had been expelled from the party, the main criterion being the "concrete attitude" in each case.

FOREIGN TREATMENT

In contrast to the restraint manifested up to now by Soviet media in registering public approval of Prague's new hardline stance, lengthy accounts of Husak's speech, including the charge of treason against Dubcek, were carried by the Moscow domestic service on the 17th and in PRAVDA the next day. Reports of the speech have also appeared in the Polish, East German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav press, as well as in the French CP's L'HUMANITE and the British CP's MORNING STAR. Romanian media and the Italian CP's L'UNITA have not so far mentioned the speech.

In the only foreign communist comment available so far, a Reiss commentary in the East Berlin domestic service on the 17th charged that Dubcek was playing the role of the martyr figure which international reaction allegedly needs now that Lon Nol, Chiang Kai-shek, and Thieu have departed the scene. It reasoned that Dubcek's martyr role well suited the aims of the opponents of the CPSU's policy of detente. At the same time, the commentary dismissed Dubcek as a "counterrevolutionary has-been," like Kerenskiy, who felt the need to remind the public of his existence. On the 21st, the East Berlin radio's review of the week's events by Leuschner singled out Husak's remarks that individuals like Dubcek, by serving the cause of anticommunism, become "traitors" to the cause they claim to advocate.

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French CP leader Marchais, in an interview carried by L'HUMANITE on the 18th, took a characteristically ambivalent stance in voicing little sympathy for Dubcek's plight while at the same time reminding the interviewer of his party's opposition to "banishment, exile, and prison." Regarding Dubcek's letter, Marchais remarked that the fallen leader was "in no position to give advice" and should have put into practice "the good principles" he has written about now at the time when he was CPCZ party leader.

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SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS

PEKING GIVES KIM IL-SONG HIGH-LEVEL WELCOME; COMMENT ROUTINE

Peking has provided a warm, high-level welcome to the North Korean party-government delegation led by Kim Il-song, on his first visit to China since 1961. Comment from both sides thus far has been routine and consistent with well-established DPRK and PRC lines on the Korean situation and Peking-Pyongyang relations. The cordial reception for Kim included a massive welcome at the Peking railroad station and an audience the day of his arrival, 18 April, with CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung, with whom Kim had a "very cordial and friendly conversation." This was Mao's first appearance in Peking in nearly a year and his first public appearance in three months. For Kim, heading a delegation composed of military, economic and foreign policy officials, this is his first trip outside North Korea since 1965, when he visited Indonesia. In 1961 he had traveled to Peking and Moscow to sign separate friendship treaties.

Following Kim's audience with Mao on the 18th, his delegation was feted by the customary banquet that evening at which he and PRC Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping spoke. The visit was hailed in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 18th and in Pyongyang's VOIUNG SONGUN on the 20th. On the 19th Kim met with Premier Chou En-lai in the hospital and began a round of talks with Teng, characterized by MCHA as taking place in a "warm atmosphere of revolutionary friendship and militant unity." On the 22d Kim and his party left Peking in the company of Teng and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua for banking and a tour of the provinces. No schedule has been announced for Kim's visit to China, but custom indicates he will return to Peking for another round of major speeches and the signing of a joint communique to conclude the visit.

KIM At the welcoming banquet in Peking on the 18th--attended
SPEECH by Cambodian Prince Sihanouk as well as high-ranking Chinese leaders--Kim observed that it was the first visit "for a long time" and he expressed appreciation for the invitation from the Chinese party, government, and Mao Tse-tung. His delegation, said Kim, would exchange views with the Chinese on present international relations and would "take effective measures for our two peoples' future common struggle to cope with the fast-changing situation."

Later in the speech Kim spoke of the steady defeats of the "U.S. imperialists" in Asia. Observing that recently they have been

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"dealt fatal blows and are sliding into an inextricable quagmire of ruin in Indochina," he cited the "great victory" in Cambodia and the virtual collapse of the Saigon regime. Kim drew no direct link between these developments and the U.S. position in Korea; however he did characterize the Korean struggle as a "major link" in the chain of the "anti-imperialist national liberation struggle." Kim had used similar terminology in a December 1974 speech at a rally for Zaire's President Mobutu, when he had argued that the people of Korea and Zaire were contributing to the "cause of anti-imperialist national liberation through the common struggle for the independent development of their respective countries."

Kim summed up the DPRK's policy toward the South when he said: "If U.S. troops pull out of South Korea and a democratic figure with national conscience comes into power in South Korea as its people demand, we will firmly guarantee a durable peace in Korea and successfully solve the question of Korea's reunification . . . by peaceful means." Kim had raised the issue of the role of a "democratic figure" in reunification in a September 1974 interview with a Panamanian journalist--publicized by KCNA on 23 October--and Foreign Minister Ho Tam had incorporated it in a major speech in November. This formulation, which seems to write off the dialog between the North and South as long as South Korean President Pak Chong-hui is in office, was repeated in Pyongyang media following Ho Tam's speech.

On 20 February, however, NODONG SIEMUN had published a list of slogans adopted by the 10th party plenum (11-17 February) which included a call for the South Korean people to "overthrow the treacherous military-fascist dictatorial regime and set up a democratic coalition government which would embrace the democratic forces of all strata." Although the emergence of a "democratic figure" in the South to aid reunification would not necessarily preclude the formation of a coalition government, DPRK media since the 10th party plenum have dropped the call for a democratic personage to take power and have called for the establishment of a "coalition government" in the South.

In line with his other statements of support for anti-Pak elements during the past year, Kim said in his Peking speech that the North, "as one and the same nation," would not look on with "folded arms" but would "strongly support" the South Korean people, should they revolt against Pak. However, he did not specifically call for Pak's overthrow, as Pyongyang comment commonly has done during recent months.

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Kim claimed that peace or war in Korea depended on the United States, "which holds all powers in South Korea," a characterization dating back to a Kim speech at a 4 March 1974 rally for Algeria's President Boumedienne and subsequently used as the rationale for Pyongyang's proposal of a peace treaty with the United States--a proposal presented in a speech by Foreign Minister Ho Tam on 25 March 1974. Kim's warning that in any future war the North would destroy the aggressors and "only lose the military demarcation line" while gaining the country's reunification was similar to remarks by Chief of Staff O Chin-u in his Army Day speech in February.

In discussing the worldwide struggle between imperialist and the anti-imperialist forces Kim noted the North would be vigilant and "firmly prepared to meet the forthcoming great revolutionary event victoriously, whether there will be war or revolution." His reference to the "forthcoming great revolutionary event" was in the context of a global struggle, and appears to be a restatement of a point made in a 4 March 1975 Kim speech in Pyongyang to a meeting of industrial activists--that "the general international situation indicates that a great revolutionary event may come in the not too distant future."

In discussing North Korean-Chinese unity, Kim asserted that the two countries' destinies were "inseparably linked," a characterization also expressed in the 20 April NODONG SINMUN editorial and in a banquet speech on the 22d in Nanking by DPRK Vice President Kim Tong-kyu. Kim's speech on the 18th contained the standard North Korean reference to the "blood-sealed" bond between Korea and China, and routinely noted the Chinese volunteers' assistance in the Korean War.

The NODONG SINMUN editorial was devoted exclusively to North Korea-Chinese ties, focusing on the "blood-sealed" relations between the two countries. It did not pick up any of Kim's comments on the Korean situation and it omitted any reference to Northern support for the struggle in the South. While it did note that "militant solidarity" between China and Korea was a "major factor in strengthening . . . the anti-imperialist national liberation forces and in expediting the fall of the imperialist aggressor forces in Asia," it failed to mention the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea.

TENG In his banquet speech in Peking on the 18th, Teng
SPEECH Hsiao-ping characterized Kim's "official friendship
 visit" as a "major event of historic significance" in
 Sino-Korean relations, and noted Mao's meeting with Kim earlier the

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same day. Teng praised the DPRK for its opposition to imperialism and "modern revisionism," one of several standard anti-Soviet barbs in Teng's speech.

Discussing the Korean situation, Teng noted that the DPRK "has repeatedly put forward correct propositions and reasonable proposals for the peaceful reunification of the fatherland." He called attention "in particular" to the three principles--incorporated in the 4 July 1972 North-South joint statement--and the five-point program for national reunification put forward by Kim Il-song on 23 June 1973, noting that they "fully accord with Korea's national interests and enjoy . . . extensive international support." Teng accused the "Pak Chong-hui clique, supported and instigated by U.S. imperialism," of opposing such proposals and trying to "sabotage" the North-South dialog.

After lauding the North's attempts at "independent and peaceful" reunification, Teng went on to say that China has "consistently supported the Korean people in their struggle for the reunification of their fatherland, resolutely supported the principles and program advanced by President Kim Il-song to attain this end."

Addressing the question of the U.S. presence in South Korea, Teng accused the U.S. of refusing to withdraw its troops and attempting to perpetuate the division of Korea through a "two Koreas" policy. He said China has "resolutely supported the Korean demand that the United States withdraw all its armed forces from South Korea," but he attached no time frame to such withdrawal. Both his comments on the troop issue and his criticism of U.S. involvement in South Korea were in line with authoritative Chinese comment on these subjects in the past year.

Teng described "an especially profound revolutionary friendship" between China and Korea, close as "lips to teeth." However, Teng deemphasized China's past military ties with Korea, failing to repeat Kim's characterization of a "blood-sealed" friendship between the two countries, and he avoided any mention of Chinese participation in the Korean War. Similarly, Teng did not portray the two countries' destinies as "inseparably linked."

The 18 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial also failed to mention Chinese participation in the war, but it did turn to an old Mao quotation to characterize the friendship between the two countries as "cemented . . . in blood." The editorial called Kim's proposals for reunification the "correct road to the reunification of Korea" and it expressed Chinese support for "peaceful" reunification of Korea.

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TENG ON Turning to broader Chinese international interests
OTHER ISSUES in his 18 April banquet speech for Kim, Teng
 restated the Chinese view that a future world war
is inevitable so long as imperialism exists, noting that "this is
something independent of man's will." Teng claimed that "what
prevails is not a so-called irreversible process of detente, but
the increasing danger of a new world war," a standard Chinese
formulation designed to underscore Chinese arguments against Soviet
allegations that the process of detente cannot be reversed. In
an unrelated ceremonial speech, Vice Premier Chi Teng-kuei echoed
Teng's formula in directly attacking Soviet efforts at detente in
Europe during a 20 April banquet speech in honor of the visiting
Belgian Prime Minister.

Teng's speech also contained Peking's most authoritative assessment
of the Middle East situation since the breakdown of Secretary
Kissinger's mediation efforts in March. Teng outwardly condemned
both U.S. and Soviet efforts for a peaceful solution, warning
that "any and all solutions" were aimed at fostering the superpowers'
respective imperialist expansion. When the Middle East adversaries
had focused attention on Secretary Kissinger's mediation efforts in
past, Peking had muffled such sweeping authoritative condemnation
of superpower peace efforts, and PRC media coverage had favorably
played up Kissinger's mediation efforts as an adroit means to
check and reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East.

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NOTES

USSR-YUGOSLAVIA: Belgrade has belatedly acknowledged Kosygin's effort during Premier Bijedic's 9-15 April visit to smooth ruffled Yugoslav feathers over alleged slights to the World War II role of Yugoslav partisans in recent articles on the World War II victory by Soviet Marshals Yakubovskiy and Grechko. Speaking at a dinner in Bijedic's honor on the 9th, Kosygin said the Soviet people would always remember the contribution of the Yugoslavs, who were the USSR's comrades in arms "from the first to the last day" of the war. A week later the 16 April issue of Belgrade's KOMUNIST commented that, after the appearance of "some texts . . . negating and belittling" Yugoslavia's war role, the Yugoslav public "received as positive" Kosygin's statement. At the same time, the Zagreb radio commentator Sundic on the 15th voiced doubt that something which "we do not like"--the alleged Soviet aspersions--would never be repeated and said it was not the Yugoslavs who were responsible for such "contradictions." The Yugoslavs' negative reaction evidently led Prague to withdraw one of the offending Soviet articles--one by Grechko in the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry weekly OBRANA LIDU. Although two Yugoslav commentaries on 3 April reported the article as having appeared that day in OBRANA LIDU, neither the 5 April issue nor the immediately preceding and following issues, which have been received in Washington, contained the Grechko article.

PRC-INDIA: Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, in a 20 April banquet speech during his current visit to Pakistan, has qualified the standard Chinese call for good-neighborly relations with "all" South Asian countries with specific criticisms of India and with endorsement of South Asian positions that conflict with Indian interests. Li directly criticized "Indian expansionists" for dismembering Pakistan in 1971, implicitly rebuffed India's recent incorporation of Indian-occupied Kashmir by reiterating PRC support for Kashmiri self-determination, and made a rare promise of Chinese support for the Sikkimese people against Indian "naked aggression." The Vice Premier also took the occasion to restate PRC support for Pakistan's proposal that a nuclear-free zone be established in South Asia and Sri Lanka's call for setting up a zone of peace there, and he added the first authoritative Chinese endorsement of the Nepalese king's plan to declare his country a zone of peace.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 14 - 20 APRIL 1975

<u>Moscow (2670 items)</u>			<u>Peking (921 items)</u>		
CPSU Central Committee	(--)	14%	Indochina	(11%)	25%
Plenum, 16 April			[Phnom Penh	(--)	17%]
[Decision to Convene	(--)	4%]	"Liberation"		
25th CPSU Congress			[Vietnam	(4%)	2%]
24 February 1976			Korean President Kim	(--)	15%*
Indochina	(5%)	9%	Il-song in PRC		
[Phnom Penh	(--)	5%]	USSR	(3%)	5%
"Liberation"			UN Law of the Sea	(--)	4%
[Vietnam	(5%)	2%]**	Conference		
Upcoming V-E Day 30th	(7%)	7%	Belgium Prime Minister	(--)	3%
Anniversary			Tindemans in PRC		
China	(4%)	4%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Kim Il-song.

** The decline in the Moscow figure results from a 75 percent reduction in FBIS' coverage of Moscow Vietnamese-language broadcasts dating from 14 April.